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PHI: Private health insurance 
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GP: General Practitioner 
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Abstract 
This study is based on the analyses of the claim patterns in the light of the theory of risk-
selection in the private health insurance market. Our aim is to study whether insures with 
group contracts have higher claims than the individual insures. However the limits in our data 
make it difficult to give a clear answer. The data is received from one of the Norwegian 
insurance companies and contains approximately 6300 processed claims from their customer 
portfolio in the period 2007-2010. We have analyzed both separate claims and aggregate 
claims per person for individual and group policyholders. We have controlled for type of the 
contract (group/individual), gender, age, geographical area, Oslo/other big city, industry 
sector (for group contracts) and reservations. Surprisingly, the type of the contract does not 
have any significant effect on the claim, neither considered separately nor aggregate per 
person.  
The analysis of separate claims has shown that the age of the policyholder has a significant 
positive impact on the size of the claims independently of the contract type. Reservations 
have an effect as well. 1% of group and 12% of individual policyholders have received 
reservations not to cover expenses connected to some particular illness they have. The 
presence of reservations has contrary effect on the size of the separate claims: negative for 
groups and positive for individuals.  
Further, we have analyzed what affects the likelihood of claiming for greater than average 
sums. We have found that age and gender (male) affect the likelihood positively for group 
contracts. Individual policyholders are more likely to claim for higher sums the older they are, 
if they have reservation, for children (i.e. being under 18 years old), while the likelihood is 
reduced for those who are registered in East Norway.  
The second part of the analysis is dedicated to the effects on the aggregate claims in the 
period 2007-2010 per person. It has shown that only the age of the policyholder has positive 
effect on the aggregate claims for group contracts. However, age does not influence size of 
aggregate claims of individual policyholders. They claim for bigger aggregate sums if they 
have reservations, come from North Norway or a big city other than Oslo.  
The analysis of the likelihood of higher aggregate claims has shown quite different results for 
individuals and groups. Group policyholders are more likely to ask for higher sums in the 
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long run the older they are, if they are males and if they come from West Norway or a big 
city. Individual policyholders are more likely to claim higher sums in long run the older they 
are and in a presence of reservations. 
We have calculated relative numbers for the average claim ratio among the insured in 2010 
and have found that it is smaller for the group contracts than for the individual. The ratio is 
equal to the number of persons who claimed in 2010 divided by the number of persons who 
were registered in 2010 as customers. The ratios contradict with the theory of risk selection. 
The theory predicts that “selected” customers are more profitable, and in our case the 
“selected” ones are individual policyholders because they are checked and they have to 
deliver health statement that can be used for giving them a reservation or even being rejected. 
The size of the aggregate claims that we have got from descriptive statistics for years 2007-
2010 differs from the results of 2010. We assume that it is caused by tendencies in the 
development of PHI market that we did not take into account. The 2007-2010 data shows 
more or less the same numbers for group and individual policyholders, while the 2010 data 
shows much smaller number for group contracts than for individual. Aggregate data in year 
2010 contradicts with the theory of risk selection and indicates that group policyholders 
(which are not selected) are more profitable customers. This shows that either risk-selection is 
not as profitable as expected or that group policyholders are a special type of people with 
special socio-economic characteristics (like that they have full-time job, and they are in the 
working age 18-68 years old and more). In addition group policyholders are usually 
subscribed automatically and therefore not all of them are clear that they have a PHI. Another 
factor is that the turnover of the customers with group contracts is smaller because of the 
automaticity of the group insurance registration process. Individual policyholders do have 
bigger turnover and they are more likely to drop insurance if they do not use it, thus, older and 
sicker are in the pool and, thus, the ratio of people with claims is higher for individuals than 
for groups. Even though the individual policyholders are selected on the basis of health status 
statements they might be an adversely selected group because of unobservable health 
differences. The aggregate data for 2007-2010 shows that there is not that much difference 
between aggregate claims of persons with group contracts and persons with individual 
contracts.  In addition, the coefficient of the contract type in the regression of the aggregate 
data set shows that group policyholders spend less than individuals (although not significantly 
less). We conclude that we did not get a clear indication for or against profitability of risk-
selection in our study, and we need more research in this field. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Aim, scope and methodology of the study 
The topic of private treatment health insurance (PHI) in Norway is of a great interest because 
it is relatively new and there is not a lot written about it. There are a lot of studies made in 
Europe and the USA about PHI. However, the results of these studies are not completely 
applicable to the Norwegian case. Whereas PHI is a main health policy in majority of other 
countries, Norway practices universal public health insurance, where PHI is a supplementary 
policy. The number of people covered by PHI in Norway is growing very rapidly. 
Furthermore, it mainly consists of people covered by employer-paid insurance. The majority 
of the previous studies in Norway focus on the demand patterns for treatment insurance and 
descriptions of the policyholders. 
The aim of our study is to detect claim patterns of people covered by PHI and to investigate 
the question of profitability of risk-selection. Customers of the insurance companies apply for 
the refund or payment for received medical help. It is called “claim”. Risk-selection is a 
situation when an insurance company selects predictably profitable customers, i.e. clients for 
whom the insurance company’s revenue exceeds the actually predicted expenses (p. 73, Van 
de Ven, 2003).  
The scope of this research is restricted to the investigation of treatment health insurance that 
gives faster access to medical help and covers the charges for using medical institutions. Our 
study does not cover life insurance, insurance for chronicle or critical illnesses or key-
personnel insurance.  
We hypothesize that due to the risk-selection for individual policyholders, there are more 
claims from the “uncontrolled” group policyholders, and their expected claims are higher than 
those from individual policyholders, which were carefully scanned by the personnel of the 
insurance company.  
When we were considering our methodology for the research, we took into account that 
insurance companies have the possibility to select (accept or refuse) and give reservations 
only among customers with individual contracts or smaller group contracts (<5 persons). We 
received a random sample of processed claims for the years 2007-2010 from an insurance 
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company.1 Hence, we categorize the data according to the type of the contract (individual and 
group). We use OLS regression and logit analysis for finding significant factors that effect 
claims. In addition we undertake descriptive analysis of the reservation patterns. To receive a 
reservation for some particular health problem means that the insurance company does not 
cover charges connected to that problem. Then we find relative numbers of claiming group 
and individual policyholders to registered numbers of group and individual policyholders 
during a period of time for a given type of contract. Finally, we calculate expected average 
claims for these two categories for the period.  We find this methodology the most appropriate 
for the limited amount of data at our disposal. 
 
1.2 Previous research 
To the best of my knowledge the research in the field of PHI in Norway is not abundant since 
PHI has been on the Norwegian market only over a decade (Aarbu, 2008). In this section we 
monitor the previous studies that focus mostly on demand patterns of Norwegian treatment 
insurance. The majority of the studies are based on the survey of living conditions from the 
Statistics Norway (SSB) combined with other available data, such as education, income etc.   
According to Aarbu (2010) there is a strong preference for PHI among self-employed and 
smokers as well as people with higher income.  Public waiting lists affect the demand for PHI 
among individual policyholders but not among policyholders of employer-paid insurance. His 
research is based on the analysis of survey data set combined with available public data on 
waiting times. Interestingly, per April 2011 the waiting time for elective treatment in hospital 
in Norway was 71 days (Dagens Næringsliv, 22.8.2011). 
Grepperud and Iversen (2011) show that the probability of being covered by employer-paid 
PHI increases for young to middle aged men (25-44 years) with high income, low educational 
level and management position, as well as for private sector (financial sector, in particular). 
Their results suggest that it is less probable to have PHI for people with higher number of 
visits to a general practitioner (GP) and patients diagnosed with at least one chronic disease. 
At the same time, self-reported health status does not have any effect. Thus, there is some 
                                                 
1 This insurance company preferred to keep its name anonymous, and, therefore, we call it ”the insurance 
company” or ”our insurance company”. 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degree of selection regarding the types of employees being offered PHI (p. 15, Grepperud and 
Iversen, 2011). 
Urkegjerde (2010) does not find any clear relationship between PHI and usage of medical 
services (visits to a GP or a specialist). However, visits to a physiotherapist significantly 
increase for people covered by employer-paid insurance. The probability of visits to a 
specialist outside of hospitals increases for women covered by individual contracts. At the 
same time, the expected number of visits to a GP decreases for women covered by group 
contracts (Urkegjerde, 2010). 
The report of Berge and Hyggen (2010) from the Institute for Labor and Social Research that 
investigate the growth of PHI in Scandinavia, gives a good theoretical background about 
types of insurance and the situation regarding PHI in Norway, as well as neighboring 
Scandinavian countries. 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 focuses on the Norwegian health system and PHI. It provides with background 
information and numbers for policyholders in Norway for recent years. Further it presents 
more specific description for the types of the contracts and their differences, calculation of the 
premiums and reasons for PHI purchase for either individuals or group policyholders. Chapter 
3 looks into the theory of risk selection, its history and development, its characteristics and 
possible ways out. It takes up the questions of risk-adjustment and adverse-selection and 
shows mechanisms of selection in case of individual versus group insurees. Chapter 4 
presents a descriptive analysis of data and statistical analysis in order to indicate significant 
correlations for group and individual contracts. Chapter 5 offers conclusions and further 
research possibilities. 
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2  Norwegian health system and PHI. 
2.1 Background information  
Norway is a welfare state that exercises social help, free education and universal health care 
coverage policies. Thus Norwegian private health treatment insurance is not compulsory, and 
it can be compared to the complementary or supplementary private health insurance in the US 
and other non-Scandinavian European countries. Generally, there are three types of private 
health insurance: substitutive, supplementary, and complementary. Substitutive insurance is 
an alternative to statutory insurance. It is available to groups of population that might be 
excluded from public coverage or that are free to opt out of the public system. In Germany 
and the Netherlands individuals with high incomes may purchase substitutive health 
insurance. Supplementary PHI allows faster access to services and the possibility to choose 
the time of visits and providers of medical services, which may result in differential access to 
the medical help depending on whether they are policyholders. Complementary PHI offers 
full or partial coverage of services that are excluded from or not fully covered by the statutory 
health care system (p. 19-20, Mossialos, Dixon, 2002).  
Private health insurance in Norway gives faster access to medical help and covers the charges 
at private hospitals and clinics (FNO, 2008). During the last 5 years the number of PHI 
contracts has increased. Figure 1 shows the increase in number of PHI policyholders in the 
insurance companies that are members of the Finance Norway Organization for the period of 
2003-2011 (Statistics of FNO, 2010, 2011). It is interesting to explore the PHI market in 
Norway as it is growing. In contrast to the situation on the Norwegian market, Danish 
insurance companies reached over one million policyholders, and this indicator remains 
steady for the last three years (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Increase in number of people covered by PHI for the period 2003-2011 for Norwegian companies 
(Finance Norway members only) (FNO, 2011) 
  
Figure 2. Growth in PHI during 2003-2010 in Denmark (FNO, 2011) 
 
 
All together, approximately 272 000 Norwegians have PHI contracts per 30th of June 2011 
(Statistics of FNO, 2011, VHA, 2011). Overview of the contracts you can see below in Table 
1 and Figure 3.  
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Table 1. PHI in Norway (Statistics FNO, 2011 and VHA, 2011). 
 Number of insured  Market share 
  30.06.11 30.06.10 30.06.09   30.06.11 30.06.10 30.06.09 
Companies members of FNO        
Individual contracts 
Försäkrings AB Skandia, filial Norge - 732 652  0,00 4,65 4,14 
Gjensidige Forsikring 1 901 1 586 1 280  11,11 10,07 8,13 
SpareBank 1 Skadeforsikring 806 - -  4,71 0,00 0,00 
Storebrand Helseforsikring 11 941 12 418 12 912  69,77 78,86 81,98 
Terra Forsikring 34 38 25  0,20 0,24 0,16 
Tryg Forsikring 2 433 972 881  14,22 6,17 5,59 
Total 17 115 15 746 15 750  100,00 100,00 100,00 
Group contracts 
Försäkrings AB Skandia, filial Norge - 16 294 18 621  0,00 14,69 20,51 
Gjensidige Forsikring 30 798 21 973 10 678  19,42 19,81 11,76 
If NUF 50 435 24 090 15 823  31,81 21,72 17,43 
SpareBank 1 Skadeforsikring 18 732 - -  11,81 0,00 0,00 
Storebrand Helseforsikring 33 169 31 446 32 511  20,92 28,35 35,81 
Tryg Forsikring 25 433 17 120 13 156  16,04 15,43 14,49 
Total 158 567 110 923 90 789  100,00 100,00 100,00 
        
Totals (all contracts) 175 682 126 669 106 539  100,00 100,00 100,00 
        
Vertikal Helseassistanse        
VHA Individual 10 241 9 583 9 020  37 38 36 
VHA Group 86 682 73 009 63 214  32 40 41 
VHA Totals 96 923 82 592 72 234  33  39 40 
        
Totals (FNO + VHA)        
Individual 27 356 25 329 24 770  100,00 100,00 100,00 
Group 245 249 183 932 154 003  100,00 100,00 100,00 
Totals 272 605 209 261 178 773  100,00 100,00 100,00 
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Figure 3 Growth in PHI 2009-2011 in Norway (based on the numbers above) 
 
2.2 Premiums 
The premiums can be risk, group, or community rated. Generally, a risk-rated premium is the 
most common way of calculating a premium for individual policyholders. They are based on 
the actuarial calculations of the probability that a policyholder makes a claim. When the 
policy is purchased through the employer, the premium is usually group-rated, and based on 
the calculations of average risk of the employees in that firm. Finally, we have community 
rated premiums that are based on the average risk in a geographically defined area (p. 20, 
Mossialos, Dixon, 2002).  
In the case of our insurance company, the premiums of the basic insurance package are 
calculated with consideration of only the age of the applicant for individual contracts and 
number of insured employees for group contracts. The older is individual policyholder, the 
more expensive is the premium. The more employees a firm wishes to ensure, the cheaper the 
premium per person is. Individuals and smaller groups (<5 persons) can possibly receive 
reservations against some health problems based on their health statements. When issued, a 
reservation entails that the insurance company does not cover expenses for a particular health 
problem (source in the insurance company). The premium to be paid for a smaller group 
contract is still less than the average premium that has to be paid by individuals above 35 
years old. Thus group coverage gives a great advantage to the people of middle age and 
above. There are no co-payments for the treatments; policyholders pay only the premium. 
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2.3 Practical difference between applications for 
individual and group contracts 
When applying for the insurance individually people are required to deliver a personal 
statement of their health status to the insurance company. They can get a reservation from the 
insurance company or even be rejected. The same rule applies for the smaller group contracts 
(where the number of insured is less than five). In case of group application the firm acts on 
behalf of its employees. If there are more than five people to insure, it is not required to turn 
in their health statements, and these people are not the subject to selection.  It is only the 
employer who turns in a statement on behalf of all employees confirming that there are no 
health obstacles for them to make their work. Thus all of them have to pay the same premium 
regardless of the health state.  
PHI is divided into modules, so that the applicant for the insurance can decide which modules 
fit best. Basic package includes treatments within the following categories: hospital, 
specialist, second opinion, rehabilitation, dental, substance abuse and addiction, plastic 
surgery, medications, rehabilitation, travel expenses, living expenses, travel companion. They 
can also choose to top up with physical treatments (like physiotherapy, manual therapy, 
chiropractor, acupuncture etc.), help from psychologist and emergency assistance or extended 
assistance (physiotherapist, manual therapy, chiropractor, classical acupuncture, home 
service).  
2.4 Reasons to purchase PHI for firms and 
individuals. 
According to Grepperud and Iversen (2011), there can be several reasons for buying group 
PHI for firms. Among them there are reducing costs of sick leave or attracting more potential 
employees (Grepperud and Iversen, 2011). However, the study from 2010 has shown that 
among all the socioeconomic factors only employment at risky jobs and access to information 
about PHI increase likelihood of PHI coverage. As a fringe good, it got a third preference out 
of five in the survey of wanted fringe goods for employees (Czertkowa, 2010).  
Furthermore, According to Grepperud and Iversen (2011), acquisition of PHI can function as 
a preventive measure against sick leaves. However, Sintef (2009), using selection of 300 of 
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members of the confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, shows that it is not possible to see the 
difference in development of absenteeism among those who have and who haven’t PHI, and 
that main reasons for the firms to purchase the PHI for their employees is to reduce waiting 
time to receive treatment for sick employees, to reduce absenteeism and to show care for the 
employees.  
As to individuals, the reasons could be more straightforward and be connected to the health 
state and negative talk in media regarding public health system (Source from the insurance 
company). Figure 4 below demonstrates the activity of media regarding the waiting time in 
the public health system (p. 31, Berge, 2010).  
Figure 4. Instances of media reference to the waiting times in public health system in Norway (Berge, 2010) 
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3 Theoretical framework2 
3.1 Risk-selection and risk-assessment 
Risk selection is the situation when an insurance company chooses the more profitable 
customers. It is a complicated phenomenon that has its roots in Europe in 1970s when, one by 
one, insurance companies started to offer cheaper policies to students and more expensive to 
the elderly. Later on they also used discrimination towards people with high-risk of getting 
sick, which triggered a spiral of further risk selection (p. 231, Wasem, 2004). Politically, it is 
not encouraged in welfare states, where equality of opportunity is given priority. We can find 
arguments in media against PHI, as the existence of PHI creates class division in the health 
sector, where people who are employed, with bigger salaries and better health get better and 
faster medical help (Manifest, 2009). As we mentioned earlier, the number of group 
policyholders is growing rapidly, while the number of individual policyholders is quite 
steady. According to Manifest’s analysis, the majority of the firms give PHI to a selection of 
people. Only 3% of them prioritize the employees in the health risk groups, 67% prioritize the 
firms’ management, 44% insure key personnel and 42% insure the owners (Manifest, 2009).  
Nowadays, from the point of view of insurance companies, risk assessment is a vital necessity 
that saves them from economic problems. They compare not properly checked customers with 
ticking bombs that might explode sooner or later. They can increase the claims to the 
insurance company and thereby stimulate an increase of premiums. This can be deterring for 
customers with average and below average claims. Left with old and sick, they would feel 
strong economic pressure and increase the premiums ratio again, worsening the loop. (p. 114-
115, Brekken, 2010) 
PHI companies use a lot of resources to check the health statement with different institutions. 
There are complete departments working only with risk assessment in order to give a suitable 
premium price. Premium elements usually are supposed to cover administration costs (annual 
costs), claim costs, and establishment costs (p. 114-115, 145, Brekken, 2010).   Risk-
assessment is necessary to make risk-adjusted premiums. Proper risk-adjusted premiums can 
remove financial uncertainty from the insurance companies. This is especially relevant for 
                                                 
2 I am using a lot of material from my term paper for the course in Structure, organization and financing of health 
care systems (HMM4202) “The problems of the risk selection” (2009). 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parts of Europe and the USA, where private insurance companies (and not the state) play 
major role in the health insurance market. Van de Ven (2003) states a number of criteria for 
the risk-adjustment in order not to harm the solidarity. Among them there are appropriateness 
of incentives of companies (effectiveness and no selection), fairness (premiums should be 
consistent with the desired solidarity), feasibility (required data should be available and 
resistant to the manipulation of the insurance company) (p. 81-82, Van de Ven, 2003).  
3.2 Different mechanisms of risk-selection 
3.2.1 Principal - agent relationship. Adverse selection 
We assume that there are two types of insurees: a “low-risk” (a person with good health) and 
a “high-risk” (a person with poor health). The “high-risk” is an individual with a high 
expected value of health care expenses, through either higher probability of needing health 
care or/and higher expected expenses if they do, and the “low-risk” is an individual with a 
low expected value of health care expenses. It is assumed that the insurance company can 
observe the distribution of health in the population, but not the health status of the individuals. 
The only two factors that they know for sure are age and occupation. Therefore the insurance 
company asks for health statement of the individual. However, some points of information 
could be hidden.  This is a factor of asymmetric information.  
We use the principal agent theory to explain it. Principal - agent relationship occurs when a 
principal makes a contract with an agent to make some tasks on his behalf (e.g. worker - 
employer, insurer - insuree) (p. 277, Pettersen, 1993). This relationship can often be 
characterized by information asymmetry, this is, hidden actions or hidden information from 
one of the parties in form of adverse selection, moral hazard or risk selection. “Moral hazard 
takes place when the act of insurance increases the likelihood of the situation that one is 
insured against” (p. 27, Mossialos, 2002). The moral hazard is ignored to set up the scope of 
the study. Adverse selection occurs because the insurer cannot calculate the accurate premium 
that will reflect the risks and sets an average premium (ibid.). However, “high-risk” 
individuals have a higher probability of needing health care or may expect higher expenses if 
they do. In both cases the expected value of their expenses will be higher than for “low-risk” 
individuals. For a given level of risk-aversion an individual with a higher expected value of 
health care expenses will find insurance more attractive than an individual with a low 
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expected value.  Many “low-risk” individuals then prefer to leave the insurance, which 
increases the number of “high-risk” individuals per insurer and thus increases the average 
premium (p. 27, Mossialos, 2002).  
3.2.2 Empirical evidence of adverse selection 
There is another point of view on the question of adverse selection. The study made in the 
USA has shown that there is no empirical evidence of adverse selection. Cardon and Hendel 
(2001) estimated a structural model of health insurance and health care choices using data 
from single individuals from the National Medical Expenditure Survey. They tested for 
unobservables linking health insurance status and health care consumption and did not find 
evidence of informational asymmetries. This observation entails that consumption of health 
care is not elastic but depends more on the real state of the health of an individual than on the 
PHI purchase. This study explains cheaper employer-provided insurance with observable 
geographic differences and price sensitivity, as well as fixed administrative costs and 
bargaining power. An alternative explanation, which is supported by very little empirical 
research, is the absence of long-term contracts, because the contracts have usually a duration 
of one year. Healthier individuals would drop contract, while individuals with poor health 
would stay in the pool. At the same time individuals with employer-provided insurance are 
not likely to withdraw from the pool (Cardon, 2001)). 
3.2.3 Usage of different contracts with a purpose of self-
selection 
From an economic and political point of view, it could be more optimal to apply a method of 
self-selection with price choice. A transition, from the method with reservations and the 
health check, to the method of self-selection and price choice, would allow to save costs on 
the risk assessment and to pave the way towards market equilibrium. In such a system at least 
two contracts would be offered, one with a low premium but high co-payments, and another 
with a high premium and low co-payments. A “low-risk” customer would prefer a cheaper 
policy that has higher co-payments. A “high-risk” customer prefers a more expensive policy 
that can cover more expenses and, by paying higher premium price for the policy, 
compensates the company for possible risks. Thus the customers can be induced to choose 
type of premium and coverage for the policy themselves (p 281, Pettersen, 1993). 
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Why would self-selection work? The higher the risk, the more expensive should the premium 
set by the insurance company (the price for the policy) be and the smaller should the co-
payments be. There is a trade-off between premium price and co-payments price. Assume that 
the “high-risk” person mimics and tells the company that he has good health and, thus, he 
receives cheaper policy intended for the “low-risk” insuree. In this case, both of them buy the 
same policy, although the health of the “high-risk” person is worse than the health of the 
“low-risk” person. The number of health services will depend on the actual health state: the 
better is health, the smaller is the number of visits to doctor. If the “high-risk” person mimics 
good health and buys the cheaper policy, he pays the same low premium as “low-risk” person. 
However, he consumes more health services and pays more expensive co-payments than the 
“low-risk person”. Therefore, he spends a lot more than the “low-risk” insuree, and because 
of that the cheaper policy would not be as attractive to the “high-risk” insuree as it is to the 
“low- risk” insuree. The “low-risk” individual spends less money on the health care. He does 
not mind so much if the co-payments are high because he is not going to spend so much 
money anyway. This individual, therefore, chooses the package with high co-payments and 
smaller premium (assuming that the person is risk neutral). The person with poor health needs 
to spend more money on buying services and therefore prefers to have lower co-payments. By 
setting the co-payments high enough in the cheaper policy, the insurance company can make 
sure that the “high-risk” individual does not prefer to mimic the “low-risk” individual and buy 
the low-premium policy. Both types of insurees will then choose the most suitable policy. 
The question is whether it would be reasonable to use the method of self-selection for 
Norwegian PHI customers today. The company we are cooperating with, as other Norwegian 
insurance companies, has a system of no-copayments for PHI. One may top-up with an 
additional package/modul (e.g. more help from psychologist or more from physiotherapist). 
This is equivalent in a way to a self-selection approach. It is possible that co-payments (as in 
car-insurance market) would be a better alternative for the insurance company in order to 
reduce the risks, and would be more politically correct towards the people (as they would be 
aloud to choose suitable for themselves price-policy). However, the difficulty is to optimize 
size of the premium and co-payments in such a way that it would be deterring from 
mimicking and attracting customers. 
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3.2.4 Relevance of adverse selection for group versus 
individual contracts 
Above described phenomenon of risk-selection is applicable only to the individual insurees in 
our study. Not-selected insurees in our case are group insurees that are insured “as they are”. 
Therefore, in our study we look on two groups of insurees: insurees with individual contracts 
and insurees with group contracts. We decided to differentiate them in this way in order to 
look if there is a phenomenon of the risk-selection here. The selected insurees are the ones 
who have individual contracts, because the insurance company screens them: they deliver a 
health statement and they may receive a reservation not to cover expenses connected to some 
particular illness, or be rejected. The not-selected insurees are the ones who have group 
contracts, because the majority of the group insurees are not screened, and thus are not subject 
to reservations or rejection.3  
When it concerns the premiums, we cannot explain their relationship with the claims as we 
are limited by the data, but we know that individual insurees pay higher premiums than group 
insurees, and the greater number of people in the group contract, the cheaper are the 
premiums for their members, as they share the risk-pool. In the company we made our study 
for, as in the majority of Norwegian PHI companies, the difference in premiums is made by 
such adjusters as age (for individual policies) and number of customers (for group policies). 
There are no co-payments, but there is something called “basic” contract and additional 
modules. Reservation based on the health statements is an additional risk-adjuster for insurees 
with individual contracts and smaller group contracts (with less than 5 people). Thus there is 
big uncertainty considering the rest of group policyholders (with above 5 participants).  
There are different factors pulling in different directions regarding the size of the claims. Due 
to the theory of risk-selection, the individual insurees will claim less than group insurees 
because the first ones are “picked” by the insurance company and the second ones are taken 
as a group without making a health check. On average, the health status screening should 
apply that the individual insurees are healthier that the group insurees. 
                                                 
3 If the data would allow us, we would have distinguished the group insurees into two subgroups: with fewer 
than 5 and with above 5 members, because the smaller groups applied the same rules considering health 
statement delivery and the reservations as individual insurees, while the larger groups are not a subject to a 
health check, and of this reason cannot neither be given reservation. However we are pressed to make more 
rough division. 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On the other hand, the individual insurees might have knowledge of health risks that are not 
revealed by their health statements. Insurees of the same age with individual contracts have 
the same type of basic contract and the same price for premiums. Therefore, we can assume 
that there may be some space for adverse selection because of the health-unobservables. This 
could drive towards higher claims within individual contracts. The fact that very few people 
buy individual health insurance could be an indication that this is a selected group of people 
that buy PHI because they think they have higher probability to get sick. 
Group contracts may have some additional adverse selection as well. The reason for this is 
that often only a group of employees in a firm is covered. It happens because the management 
might choose them or because many other employees (who feel confident about their health) 
drop insurance as a benefit and rather chooses a higher salary. This would raise claims within 
the group contracts. Additionally, majority of the group insurees are not checked, which 
means the average health state would be lower than in screened group. Lower average health 
status should imply higher health care expenses. However there is a factor pulling in the 
opposite direction: not all the employees are clear about the fact that they are insured and how 
to use insurance. Unlike these group insurees, the individuals are very clear about usage and 
aim of insurance because they buy the insurance in order to use it. The factor that they are 
being screened and chosen reduces the risks of higher claims. 
So we see that there are various factors that pull in each direction. It is difficult to tell which 
effect is stronger and we need more research on this field. In the empirical section below we 
will test a working hypothesis that the risk-selection is the dominating factor and results in 
lower expected claims within individual than the group contracts. 
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4 Empirical study 
4.1 Hypothesis 
As mentioned in the introduction, our aim is to study claim patterns in the light of the theory 
of risk-selection. We hypothesize that the group policyholders claim more than individual 
policyholders because the former are not selected, whereas the latter are carefully scanned and 
those with bad health problems have been given reservations not to cover some particular 
illnesses or even have been rejected. To find out more about the claims and the risk-selection 
we run a regression to compare these two groups, their demand and claim patterns.  
4.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
We receive a data set from a Nordic insurance company. The data set contains a random 
sample of processed claims from people with individual and employer-paid contracts. We 
have approximately 6300 claims made by approximately 2200 people in the period 2007-
2010. The descriptive statistics is presented in Table 2. The first three columns in the table are 
data over submitted claims; the last three columns are collapsed data per person. Not all of the 
variables are used in the analysis, but we consider that the data below gives a good general 
overview over the people who claimed. We divide them into categories:  group contracts, 
individual contracts and all those who have received reservations (regardless the contract 
type). We divide variables into following sections; Claims, Occupation, Geography, Age and 
Gender, and Contract; and present an explanation for each category of variables below. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of claims: PHI 2007-2010 
 Data on claims (2007-2010) Aggregate data on people (2007-2010) 
Variable Group 
claims 
Individual 
claims 
Claims 
having 
reservations 
Group 
policyholders 
Individual 
policyholders, 
Policyholders 
having 
reservations 
N, number of 
observations 
5966 311 106 2036 163 46 
       
Claims       
Mean of claims 6630.78 10771.61 23279,98 - - - 
Mean of 
aggregate claims 
per person 
- - - 19429,89 20551,98 53686,48 
Higher claims - 
D4 
0.16 0.14 0,22 
 
- - - 
Higher aggregate 
claims - D 
- - - 0,18 0,11 0,20 
       
Occupation - D       
Primary sector  0,03 - 0,04 0,05 - 0,04 
Secondary sector  0,25 - 0,15 0,34 - 0,13 
Tertiary sector  0,71 - 0,32 0,61 - 0,39 
Fishing  0,003 - 0,03 0,00 - 0,02 
       
Geography - D       
Oslo 0,18 0,09 0,14 0,13 0,09 0,17 
Big cities other 
than Oslo 
0,49 0,48 0,27 0,4 0,5 0,29 
Province/Smaller 
city 
0,33 0,43 0,59 
 
0,47 0,41 0,54 
East 0,34 0,38 0,48 0,37 0,36 0,48 
                                                 
4 “-D” mean dummy variable: 1 is true, 0 is false.  
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West 0,51 0,50 0,36 0,43 0,53 0,35 
North 0,03 0,05 0,10 0,05 0,05 0,11 
Middle 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,04 0,00 
South 0,06 0,03 0,06 0,08 0,02 0,07 
       
Age and gender       
Year of birth  1965 1974 1966 1966 1967 1967 
Age when 
claimed 
44,34 35,64 43,30 - - - 
Kid (age<18)-D 0,00 0,21 0,00 0,00 0,26 0,00 
Adult -D 1,00 0,79 1,00 1,00 0,74 1,00 
age20_39 -D - - 0,46 0,38 0,31 0,43 
age40_59 -D - - 0,43 0,53 0,40 0,43 
age60_79 -D - - 0,10 0,09 0,01 0,13 
Mean age when 
claiming 
- - - 43,25 33,47 42,69 
Gender (1-M, 0-
F)  
0,68 0,46 0,58 
 
0,68 0,45 0,61 
       
Contract       
Average number 
of applications 
- - - 2,93 1,91  
Reservations -D 0,01 0,16 1,00 0,01 0,12 1,00 
Contract type (1-
Group, 0-
Individual)  - D 
1 0 0,53 
 
1,00 0,00 0,59 
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4.2.1 Claims 
The first section of Table 2, Claims, needs detailed explanation. Mean of claims stands for the 
average size of the submitted claims. Mean of aggregate claims per person stands for the 
average size of the aggregate claims per person in the period 2007-2010. A higher claim is a 
dummy indicating submitted claims above 6835 NOK. 6835 NOK is the average of all 
submitted claims, and in our case it distinguishes high claims from low claims. 
Correspondingly, a higher aggregate claim is a dummy representing aggregate claims per 
person higher than 19513 NOK. 19513 NOK is the average of all aggregate claims per 
person. 
Group and individual policyholders claim for approximately equal aggregate sums in the 
period 2007-2010. 18 % of the group policyholders and 11 % of the individual policyholders 
submit higher than average aggregate claims. However, separate claims made by persons with 
group contracts are much smaller than the ones made by persons with individual contracts. It 
indicates that group policyholders claim small sums but often and thereby pool a quite high 
amount of money. We can see it from the variable average number of applications: group 
policyholders turn in three claims on average, while individual policyholders turn in only two. 
20% of policyholders with reservations claim for higher than average aggregate sums. Given 
that their average claim is twice bigger than what is the average for the individual or group 
contracts, we can suppose that if the insurees get reservation for some particular health 
problem, they have many other health problems that are not taken into account by the 
insurance company.  
4.2.2 Industrial sector 
We have variables concerning sector of occupation only for the group contracts. We do not 
have such information about the individual policyholders. Figure 5 shows the distribution of 
the sectors of occupation of the insurees with group contracts per submitted claim and per 
person. The proportions are curious here. There are 5 % of persons engaged in the industries 
of primary sector, 34 % of secondary sector and 61 % of tertiary sector; while the distribution 
of the claims is 3 %, 25 % and 72 % for primary, secondary and tertiary sector respectively. 
We see that people from tertiary sector claim more than people in primary or secondary 
sector. We assume that the factor of information could play a role here: information about 
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PHI is more spread among people working in the offices in tertiary sector than among people 
working in manufacturing and production. This is supported by the research made by 
Grepperud and Iversen (2011), where they found that people working in the financial sector 
have significantly greater percentage PHI policyholders than those working in other sectors.  
Figure 5. Sectors of occupation per claim and per person 
 
Our analysis has shown that the insurees from fishing industry (which is a part of primary 
sector) make generally higher claims than insurees working in other sectors. However, the 
number of the observables is too small and we cannot rely on it:  0, 32 % of all the submitted 
claims come from people working in fishing industry.  
As presented in Figure 6, the percentage of people who work within the three industrial 
sectors nationally is respectively 3 %, 20 % and 77 % (SSB, 2010). Percentage of people with 
claims from our data set is 3 %, 25 % and 72 % per primary, secondary and tertiary industry 
sectors, which, more or less, corresponds to the national numbers. 5 
                                                 
5 The national data from the source is not very precise: they have one common number for people working 
with mining and manufacturing, while the former one is a primary sector, and latter is a secondary sector. I 
registered that number to the secondary sector. Thus the real numbers have to be a bit higher for primary 
sector and a bit lower for secondary sector. 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Figure 6. Sectors of occupation: national data for Norway in 2009 (SSB, 2010) 
 
4.2.3 Geography 
Figure 7 illustrates our distribution of the regions where the policyholders (for individual 
contracts) or the firms (for the group contracts) are registered: East 38 %, West 45 %, Middle 
4 %, South 8 %, and North 5 %. West and East regions are leading. South, North and Middle 
are lagging behind. According to SSB (2011), see Figure 8, there are about 50 % of national 
population registered in the East, 26 % in the West, 9 % in the Middle, 6 % in the South, and 
9 % in the North region. Thus we observe that East, North, and Middle regions are 
underrepresented, while South and West regions are overrepresented. In Figure 8, we sum up 
distribution of claiming policyholders by region and compare to national numbers of the 
population registered in the regions. We observe regional variations of the numbers of the 
insurees with individual and group contracts and the ones with reservations. North and East 
Norway have the highest number of policyholders with reservations compared to other two 
categories; West Norway has relatively more individuals; South Norway has more people 
with group contracts and the ones with reservations; Middle Norway has more or less equal 
percentage of people with individual and group contracts and does not have anybody with 
reservations. 
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Figure 7. Region of registration of claiming policyholders (without division into subgroups): South 8 %, East 38 
%, West 45 %, Middle 4 %, and North 5 % 
 
Figure 8. Distribution: different types of policyholders in regions and population (our data set and SSB, 2011) 
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4.2.4 Age 
Figure 9 shows the age when people claim (without division into subgroups). It has 
approximately normal distribution, which is shown by the drawn curve. There we can see that 
majority of claiming people are between 35 and 55 years old. 
Figure 9. Claim age 
 
4.2.5 Types of contracts, coverage and reservations 
As we can see in Figure 10 in our sample there are 7 % people with individual contracts and 
93 % with group contracts. To compare with national numbers of the insurees we can use 
Table 1. We find following distribution between the individual insurees and group insurees: 
2009 has 14% / 86%, 2010 has 12% / 88%, 2011 has 10% / 90%. These numbers indicate a 
trend: share of the group insurees grow, while share of the individual insurees fall by 2% each 
year during last three years. So, if we calculate approximate share of the insurees in 2007-
2010 following the pattern of the trend, it should be 15% / 85%. That indicates that only 50% 
of the individual insurees claimed in the period 2007-2010, while the corresponding number 
for the group insurees was 91%. Unfortunately we do not have accurate data on the number of 
insurees in 2007-2009 to be able to support our conclusions.
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Figure 10. Distribution of the policyholders by the contract type 
 
Table 3 presents an overview of the coverage types. 94 % of submitted claims account for the 
treatment insurance for the group insurees and 5 % for the individual insurees; as little as 0,75 
% claims are for an operation warranty or a specialist treatment; and only 0,13 % are for 
rehabilitation. Co-insurance for the partners is more used by insurees covered by individual 
contracts (0,18%) as compared to 0,08 % for those covered by employer-paid contract. 
Table 3. Coverage 
What type of coverage % Cum. 
Rehabilitation 0,13 0.13 
Operation warranty /Specialist treatment 0,75 0.88 
Treatment insurance - group 94,04 94.92 
Treatment insurance/spouse - group 0,08 95.00 
Treatment insurance - individual 4,83 99.82 
Treatment insurance/spouse - individual 0,18 100.00 
 
Reservation is a dummy and shows if the person has received a reservation from the insurance 
company not to cover expenses connected to some particular health problem. 2 % of the 
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people in our data set have received reservations. They have submitted only 1.7 % of all the 
claims.  About 9 % of the claims are “zero claims” – filed but not compensated (when there is 
no valid reason for the compensation). Only 3 % from the 2% of the people with reservations 
make “zero-claims”. Thus to give reservation can be considered as a deterring measure 
against “zero-claims”. 
We checked whether there are correlations between reservations and some particular industry 
codes but we didn’t find any significant results. Then we checked with the help of logit 
analysis if there are any factors influencing the likelihood of having reservations. We 
controlled for age, gender, Oslo / other big city and regions, and did not find any significant 
effects. Then we run an OLS regression to see what factors influence size of the aggregate 
claims for the people with reservations. We have controlled for type of contract, gender, age, 
region, Oslo /other big city, occupation. We found a significant increase of people who come 
from North Norway and significant decrease of people who come from big cities other than 
Oslo. When segregating individual and group policyholders, we found out that group insurees 
claim for smaller aggregate sums if they come from Oslo, while individuals do so if they 
come from other big city than Oslo.  
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4.3 Empirical analysis 
We have divided our empirical analysis in two sections. Section 4.3.1 is dedicated to the 
analysis of the claims. We have 6277 observations of the claims; among them there are 311 
claims made by people covered by individual contracts and 5966 claims made by people 
covered by employer-paid contracts. Section 4.3.2 analyzes collapsed dataset where 
information about each person was aggregate. We have 2199 observations of people, where 
163 are covered by the individual contracts and 2036 are covered by group contracts. 
4.3.1 Analysis of claims 
Analysis of the factors that influence the size of the claims 
We use OLS regression with clustered standard errors by person since the same people deliver 
several of the claims and thus the data are correlated. The dependent variable is the size of the 
claims. We run regressions for three groups of data, as shown in Table 4: all claims, claims 
from groups and claims from individual policyholders. We have run different analyses, and 
came to the conclusion that not all the coefficients are robust to different specifications. We 
have chosen to control for such variables as group, gender, age, geographical region, Oslo, 
big cities other than Oslo, industry sector (for employer-paid contracts) and reservations. All 
the variables except the dependent variable and age are dummies. We expected the group 
contract to give significant effect on the claims when we analyze all the submitted claims in 
our data set, but it was not the case. However, there is significant positive effect of age and 
negative effect of secondary and tertiary sectors. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on the effect 
of the sector for the first regression as sector has observations only for the group contracts and 
not for the individual contracts and, thus, is strongly correlated with groups. 
When we make the analysis of each type of contract separately (columns 4-5-6-7 of Table 4), 
we get a significant increase in claims the older the policyholder is, and it is important to 
notice that the increase is a lot higher for insurees with individual contracts than for the 
insurees with group contracts. Surprisingly, the sector of occupation and the geographical 
area do not have any significant effect on the claims for each type of the policyholders 
separately. At last, we get significant effect of reservations and that effect differs for group 
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and individual policyholders: negative for the group policyholders and positive for the 
individual policyholders.  
Table 4. OLS regressions with clustered standard errors by person ID number. The dependent variable is claim 
size. There are three regressions: for all claims, for claims from group policyholders and for claims from 
individual policyholders. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * 1%, ** 5%, ***10%.  
Variables Totals Group contracts Individual contracts 
Nr of observations 6277 5966 311 
 Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err 
Group contract -7312,87 4950,53 - - - - 
Gender (1-M, 0-F) 688,76 1193,60 187,14 1078,68 1657,30 4795,72 
Age when 
claiming 
122,80* 30,08 127,50* 29,06 449,35** 220,83 
Kid (Age<18) -2848,15 3643,09 -1166,40 815,60 11626,94 7252,60 
North 8155,92 6794,39 1931,53 3321,43 85407,48 53977,70 
East -2838,83 1984,21 -2085,03 1946,26 -15888,77 10855,29 
West -549,71 1626,43 -984,25 1684,80 10356,35 7199,46 
Oslo 7,95 663,71 -425,09 612,31 -2347,33 4528,10 
Other big cities 
than Oslo 
488,48 1412,62 1055,18 1466,13 -26969,05 17404,32 
Secondary 3584,99** 1681,94 2560,85 1735,55 - - 
Tertiary 3755,50** 1885,03 2341,18 1685,81 - - 
Primary 4324,37 3278,53 4013,01 3604,76 - - 
Reservation 15163,48 12330,49 -1704,11** 976,13 25086,18*** 14489,17 
Intercept 4943,76 3961,19 -837,49 2418,77 -2978,21 10180,12 
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Logit analysis of the factors that influence likelihood of the higher claims than 
average 
We make logit analysis where dependent variable is a dummy indicating greater size of the 
claims than the average of all the submitted claims (6835 NOK). We will call it just “higher 
claims” to give it a shorter name. As shown in Table 5, we have controlled for the same 
variables as in the previous analysis: type of contract, gender, and age, sector of occupation 
(for group contracts), region, Oslo /other big cities and reservations. Surprisingly, group 
contract does not have any effect on the likelihood of higher claims. For both group and 
individual policyholders the likelihood of higher claims increases the older they are. The 
differences between them are as follows. For the group policyholders the likelihood of higher 
claims increases for males, while for the individual policyholders it increases for children and 
if they have reservations and decreases for policyholders from East Norway.  
That decrease could be possibly explained by big number of medical institutions in East 
Norway, and thus shorter waiting lists and relatively small distances to the places of medical 
help compared to other regions. Aarbru’s (2010) overview of waiting times in different 
provinces in Norway supports this assumption. As to reservations, we assume that they 
increase the likelihood of higher claims possibly because policyholders with reservations have 
other major health problems that are not taken into account by the insurance company. 
Likelihood increases for children probably because majority of parents purchase PHI in case 
of poor health of the child (we observe that there are very few children with insurance). 
We have done logit analysis as well for dummy age categories (all other variables than age 
are kept the same). The results are pretty similar as in the above described logit analysis. The 
likelihood of higher than average claims among group insurees is positively affected by 
gender (male) and age group of 21-40 years old. When considering the individual insurees, 
the likelihood is affected positively by reservations and affected negatively by age group 21-
40 and East.  
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Table 5. Logit analysis.  The dependent variable is a dummy indicating higher claims than average (6835 NOK). 
There are three regressions: for all claims, for claims from group policyholders and for claims from individual 
policyholders. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * 1%, ** 5%, ***10%. 
Variables Totals Group contracts Individual contracts 
Nr of observations 6277 5965 311 
 Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err 
Group contract 0,10 0,38 - - - - 
Gender (1-M, 0-F) 0,13*** 0,08 0,14*** 0,08 0,08 0,35 
Age when claiming 0,01* 0,00 0,01* 0,00 0,06* 0,02 
Kid (Age<18) 0,11 0,43 0,00 (omitted) 1,69** 0,80 
North -0,14 0,22 -0,08 0,23 -1,03 1,02 
East -0,04 0,14 0,04 0,14 -1,45** 0,67 
West 0,01 0,15 0,03 0,16 -0,38 0,57 
Oslo -0,03 0,12 -0,08 0,13 0,59 0,63 
Other big cities 
than Oslo 
-0,10 0,14 -0,08 0,15 -0,56 0,47 
Secondary 0,04 0,34 0,03 0,34 - - 
Tertiary -0,04 0,33 -0,04 0,33 - - 
Primary -0,35 0,40 -0,34 0,40 - - 
Reservation 0,47*** 0,25 0,23 0,34 1,08** 0,44 
Intercept -2,27* 0,26 -2,12* 0,38 -3,73* 1,17 
Log likelihood -2699,63  -2573,92  -117,80  
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4.3.2 Analysis per person 
In section 4.3.2 we analyze collapsed data set per person. We want to find effects on the size 
of the aggregate claims per person in the period 2007-2010.  
Analysis of the factors that influence the size of aggregate claims per person 
As shown in Table 6, we make OLS regressions of the aggregate data per person for three 
categories of insurees: all, groups and individuals. The dependent variable is the size of the 
aggregate claims for 2007-2010. As in the previous analyses, we control for the contract type, 
gender, age, occupation, geographical area and reservations. We expected that group 
contract would give a significant effect on the aggregate claim size. The estimate is negative, 
and it contradicts with the theory of risk-selection: since the group insurees are not checked, 
they are supposed to have greater average claim size. However the estimate is not significant. 
Analyzing group insurees, we found out that only the age has significant effect on the size of 
the aggregate claims. Insurance companies usually use age as a main factor of risk-
assessment. Unexpectedly, neither geographical area, nor gender, nor occupation nor 
reservations have any significant effect on the size of the aggregate claims from the group 
insurees. We assume that the reason behind is that the group policyholders have special socio-
economic characteristics. They all have full-time jobs, they are in working age (18-68 year 
old), and many of them have leader positions, regardless geographical area and occupation. In 
addition, they almost do not receive reservations (only 1 % of them have reservations 
compared to 12 % of individual insurees).  
Considering estimates for individual policyholders, we observe that on the contrary to groups, 
the age does not have any significant effect on the aggregate claim size. We do not have any 
explanation for this. Only such factors as reservations, North, big cities other than Oslo do 
have positive significant effect on the aggregate claim size.  The reasons for North being 
significant could be poor health state and distant location of the medical institutions. The 
research made by Statistic Norway (SSB) shows that there are more people with poor health 
in North Norway (SSB, 2009). We do not have any explanation for the effect of big cities 
other than Oslo. Regarding the effect on the size of the aggregate claims by reservations, we 
assume that the insurees with reservations have in practice more health problems that are not 
accounted for by the insurance company.  
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Table 6. OLS regression. The dependent variable is aggregate claim size. There are three regressions: for all 
claims, for claims from group policyholders and for claims from individual policyholders. Statistical significance 
is denoted as follows: * 1%, ** 5%, ***10%. 
Variables/Nr of 
observations 
Totals, 2199 obs. Group contracts, 2036 
obs. 
Individual contracts, 163 
obs. 
 Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err 
Group contract -5819,03 19530,96 - - - - 
Gender (1-M, 0-F) 3546,71 3485,69 2602,63 3359,90 945,07 19951,63 
Age when claiming 491,36* 146,51 515,28* 138,86 1014,16 1041,63 
Kid (Age<18) -2888,29 13983,37 -7324,01 69158,24 27900,23 37644,65 
North 18685,38** 8573,22 5751,04 8165,98 183167,40* 61984,84 
East -3998,99 5486,92 -2780,25 5178,38 -29642,33 43794,23 
West 5495,73 5846,90 5244,73 5602,12 33210,45 40976,92 
Oslo 6441,15 5623,65 6791,98 5349,73 -3866,16 36927,14 
Other big cities 
than Oslo 
7140,13 5361,87 9081,74 5223,47 63367,90** 29464,34 
Secondary -2474,34 18558,38 -5737,28 17098,86 - - 
Tertiary 5959,91 18404,34 2292,47 16951,21 - - 
Primary 2424,18 19993,29 1238,18 18423,44 - - 
Reservation 33910,30* 11506,51 -9937,87 13432,80 73957,42** 32840,23 
Intercept -7224,56 10326,76 -10032,92 18229,52 -13742,15 63679,43 
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Logit analysis of the factors that influence the likelihood of higher aggregate 
claims than average  
As shown in table 7, we run logit analysis of the aggregate data per person for three categories 
of insurees: all, groups and individuals. The dependent variable this time is a dummy 
indicating higher size of aggregate claims than average (19513). We control for the contract 
type, gender, age, occupation, geographical area, and reservations. As in the previous 
analysis, the group contract does not affect significantly the likelihood of higher size of the 
aggregate claims. However the coefficient for the group contract, which is positive, supports 
the theory of risk-selection: persons with group contracts do claim more often for higher size 
of the aggregate claims than individuals. 
Unexpectedly, we get completely different significant effects on the likelihood of higher 
aggregate claim sums, when we analyze data for group and individual insurees separately 
compared to the previous analysis. It is not only age, but as well gender (male), west and big 
cities have positive effect on the likelihood for the group policyholders. Occupation and 
reservations do not influence it at all. It is possible that a big city is an influential variable 
because life in the big cities is more stressful. Regarding gender and age, it is typical that 
demanding and risky positions in the firms are taken by males of middle age and above, 
which can be reflected on their health state. However it is only assumptions. For the 
individual policyholders only such factors as age and reservations have positive effect on the 
likelihood. Surprisingly, neither geographical area nor gender influences it. As we discussed 
earlier, there is significant number of reservations only in individual contracts. Reservations 
can be an indicator for more complex health problems that are not taken into account by the 
insurance company. 
33 
 
 
Table 7. Logit analysis.  The dependent variable is a dummy indicating higher aggregate claims than average 
(19513). There are three regressions: for all claims, for claims from group policyholders and for claims from 
individual policyholders. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * 1%, ** 5%, ***10%. 
 
Variables Totals Group contracts Individual contracts 
Nr of observations 2199 2035 163 
 Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err 
Group contract 0,77 0,64 - - - - 
Gender (1-M, 0-F) 0,38* 0,13 0,41* 0,13 0,07 0,54 
Age when claiming 0,02* 0,01 0,02* 0,01 0,07** 0,03 
Kid (Age<18) -1,53 1,06 0,00 (omitted) 0,15 1,43 
North 0,10 0,35 0,12 0,36 0,17 1,68 
East 0,21 0,22 0,26 0,23 -0,58 1,26 
West 0,58* 0,22 0,55** 0,23 1,06 1,20 
Oslo 0,43** 0,20 0,39*** 0,20 1,23 0,92 
Other big cities 
than Oslo 0,31 0,20 0,37*** 0,21 -0,82 0,75 
Secondary -0,79 0,59 -0,82 0,60 - - 
Tertiary -0,43 0,59 -0,45 0,59 - - 
Primary -0,85 0,67 -0,85 0,67 - - 
Reservation 0,27 0,39 -0,23 0,55 1,43** 0,71 
Intercept -3,35* 0,40 -2,52* 0,65 -5,11* 1,84 
Log likelihood -977,06  -924,45  -47,90  
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5 Discussion, conclusions and further 
research 
5.1 Discussion  
The division into group and individual contracts is coarse, but it gives us some picture of the 
claim patterns depending on the selection. If there had been data on the number of insured per 
contract, I would have divided people in data set in three groups – smaller groups with 
employer-paid contracts, bigger groups with employer-paid contracts and the individual 
contracts. The interesting thing would be to investigate the difference between those who 
deliver health statement and those who do not, because then we would talk about pure 
selection and solidarity. Unfortunately, I did not have available data for number of insured in 
the group contracts. Within this information available, the topic can be further investigated in 
future.  
To calculate relative numbers for the selection profitability, we use the data on the claims for 
2010. Since there is more data available for 2010, we can get more precise information for 
that year than for 2007, 2008 or 2009. Table 8 reveals all the numbers. To calculate the claim 
ratio in 2010, we count number of people who claimed in 2010 and divide it by number of all 
the customers of the insurance company in 2010. Further we want to calculate expected size 
of the aggregate claims per year 2010 per insuree with group and with individual contracts 
respectively. To do it, we calculate average sum of claims per person and average number of 
the claims per year for group and for individual insurees correspondingly with help of 
STATA. Thus the expected size of the aggregate claim per year per insuree registered in the 
insurance company in 2010, is approximated by the product of the claim ratio times average 
size of the aggregate claims in 2010. 
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Table 8. Relative numbers for claim ratio and expected size of the claims per person in 2010 
Type of 
contract 
Claim ratio 
in 2010 
Average 
size of 
aggregate 
claims per 
person in 
2010, 
NOK 
Average size 
of the claim 
in 2010, 
NOK 
Average nr 
of claims per 
person in 
2010 
Expected size 
of aggregate 
claims per 
person in 
2010, NOK 
Group 0,06 14434,00 6358,59 2,27 864,19 
Individual 0,09 25128,00 14868,64 1,69 2300,81 
 
According to the results above, the claim ratio of group policyholders who claimed in 2010 
was 0.06, while the same ratio for the individual insurees was equal to 0.09. Furthermore, the 
average size of the aggregate claims per person in 2010, the average size of the separate 
claims in 2010 and the expected size of the aggregate claims per person insured in the 
insurance company are much higher for individuals than for groups. This contradicts with the 
theory of risk selection. The individual policyholders are the selected ones because they have 
to deliver the health statement and can be given reservations or can be even rejected. Group 
policyholders are required to bring the health statement only when less than five people are 
insured by the same group contract (thus we have only 1 % of group insurees with 
reservations compared to 12 % of individual insurees with reservations in our data set). Thus 
in average they are not as selected as the individual insurees. Hence, due to the risk-selection 
theory, the individual policyholders are supposed to have fewer claims as only the “good” 
ones are selected.  
If we would use the average size of aggregate claims from descriptive statistics in 2007-2010 
(see Table 2), where group and individual policyholders claim approximately the same 
amounts of money (19430 NOK and 20550 NOK for groups and individuals respectively), the 
difference in the expected size of aggregate claims per client would be much smaller, but still 
indicating greater sums for the individual policyholders due to higher claim ratio in 2010. We 
cannot explain why the numbers for 2010, presented in Table 8, differ so much from the 
numbers in the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, Table 2. We assume that claims 
and demand reveal some trends overtime that we did not take into account in our study. The 
study of these trends is left for future research.  
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According to both descriptive statistics for 2007-2010 data and estimates given in Table 8, the 
group policyholders claim in average more often than the individual policyholders, which is 
an indication for the theory of risk-selection. This could be explained by reservations, which 
are mostly given to the individual insurees. It is possible that without the reservations a 
number of claims would increase as well as their size. According to the average claim size in 
Table 2, the insurees with reservations claim for twice as big sum of money than individual 
insurees in general and three times greater sums than the average group insuree (6630 NOK, 
10772 NOK and 23280 NOK for groups, individuals and persons with reservations 
respectively), which could indicate that the people who have already got a reservation might 
have more complex health problems. 
Furthermore, according to the coefficient for group contract in Table 7, the group 
policyholders claim for higher than average aggregate sums more often than individual 
policyholder (though number is not significant), which is an indicator for the theory of risk-
selection. 
Age, sometimes regions, gender and reservations are the only factors that have significant 
effect on the size of the claims.  We sum up all the significant results in Table 9. Age is a 
significant factor almost always, except for the aggregate claims for individuals. Reservations 
affect claims of individuals positively, while they either do not effect at all or have negative 
effect on the average claims from the group policyholders. The males with the group contracts 
have greater values of claims more often than the females, while gender does not affect claims 
of individual policyholders. The registration in some geographical areas has effect on the 
number and size of the claims from individual policyholders. Individuals from East Norway 
have less number of greater claims than individuals from other areas, while those from the 
North and other big cities than Oslo claim more often for higher aggregate sums. That goes 
together with the fact that people from North Norway have poorer health than people from 
other regions, and the medical institutions there are distant. Group policyholders from West 
Norway and from big cities in general claim for higher aggregate sums as well. However we 
do not have any good explanation for this. 
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Table 9. Overview of variables with significant effects on claims (“+” means positive effect, “-” means negative 
effect) 
Effect on what Group contracts Individual contracts 
Size of the claim age +, reservation - age +, reservation + 
The likelihood of “high claim” 
(higher then average, which is 
6835 NOK) 
age +, gender (male) + age+, reservation +, children+, 
east - 
Size of the aggregate claims per 
person 
age+ reservations+, north +, other big 
cities than Oslo + 
The likelihood of “high 
aggregate claim” (higher then 
average, which is 19513 NOK 
age +, gender (male)+, west +, 
big cities +, 
age+, reservation+ 
 
5.2 Conclusions and further research 
The conclusions about profitability of risk-selection are not clear. We have several 
possibilities. First, the risk-selection could be not as profitable as expected. Second, the group 
policyholders, being united by special socio-economic characteristics, could have better 
health than individual policyholders (to answer this dilemma, we need more research to 
control for health state of the policyholders, which could be a topic for a future research). 
Third, there might be adverse selection in the individual contracts since there could be 
unobservable health differences that are not revealed through the health status statements. 
Fourth, not all the group insurees know that they have been insured as insurance is often 
assigned automatically when one starts to work. While individual insurees when subscribing 
have an intention to use insurance, perhaps because they think they have a high risk. These 
could be some of the explanations of lower claim ratio per person for group policyholders, 
and each of those assumptions deserves to be researched in future.  
Furthermore, to analyze risk-selection as a complete phenomenon for the PHI companies, one 
could make cost benefit analysis, including administrative costs and the costs for the risk-
assessment, for several Nordic PHI companies. PHI companies have a tendency to have 
higher administrative costs related to billing, contracting, marketing, analyzing premiums and 
prices, payment or refusal of the claims etc. (p 20, Mossialos, Dixon, 2002). This is especially 
relevant for the case of individual insurance where there are whole departments working with 
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analysis of the premiums and prices, checking health statements of the policyholders and 
designing contracts.  
Besides, it is worth to make study about factors behind firms subscribing for group PHI. A 
similar study about connection between types of the jobs and the employee coverage was 
made in USA (Marquis, 2001).  According to Marquis (p. 274-275, 2001) factors that 
influence the choice of the firms to buy insurance for the employees could be tax ratios, the 
concentration in the labor market, the mix of other employers, the size of the firm, the 
unionization degree, the type of the industry, and the degree of regulation. This kind of 
research would be very interesting to make in Norway too. 
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